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When market structure is complete, factor demands by households will be independent of 
their characteristics, and households will take their production decisions as if they were 
profit-maximizing firms.  This observation constitutes the basis for one of the most 
popular empirical tests for complete markets, commonly known as the "separation" 
hypothesis.  In this paper, we show that all existing tests for separation using panel data 
are potentially biased towards rejecting the null-hypothesis of complete markets, because 
of the failure to adequately control for unobservable individual effects.  Since the 
variable on which the test for separation is based cannot be identified in most panel 
datasets following the usual covariance transformations, and is likely to be correlated 
with the individual effect, neither the within nor the variance-components procedures are 
able to solve the problem.  We show that the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator, in which 
the impact of covariates that are invariant along one dimension of a panel can be 
identified through the use of covariance transformations of other included variables that 
are orthogonal to the individual effects as instruments, provides a simple solution.  We 
furnish an empirical illustration in which separation —and thus the null of complete 
markets— is strongly rejected using the standard approach, but is not rejected once 
correlated unobservable individual effects are controlled for using the Hausman-Taylor 
instrument set. 
 
Keywords: panel data, individual effects, household models, testing for incomplete 
markets, development microeconomics. 
 




Test de séparabilité dans les modèles de ménage  et effets individuels 
inobservables 
 
Lorsque les marchés sont complets, les demandes de facteurs par ménage sont 
indépendantes des caractéristiques de ces derniers et les ménages se comportent tels des 
firmes qui maximisent leurs profits. Cette observation est à la base de l’un des plus 
célèbre test de l’hypothèse de marchés complets, communément nommée l’hypothèse de 
« séparabilité ». Dans cet article, nous montrons que l’ensemble des tests de séparabilité 
utilisant des données de panel sont potentiellement biaisés vers un rejet systématique de 
cette hypothèse, et ce, en raison de la non prise en compte de l’hétérogénéité 
inobservable. Les variables sur lesquelles le test de séparabilité repose sont 
généralement (i) corrélées avec l’effet individuel inobservable et (ii) invariantes dans le 
temps. Dans ce cas, les différentes méthodes d’estimation en panel (effets fixes ou effets 
aléatoires) ne nous permettent pas  d’identifier sans biais les coefficients associés à ces 
variables. L’estimateur proposé par Hausman-Taylor (1981) constitue une solution à ce 
problème, dans la mesure ou il identifie sans biais l’effet de variables invariantes dans le 
temps corrélées avec l’effet fixe, et ce, même en l’absence d’instruments externes. Nous 
fournissons une illustration empirique de cet estimateur et nous montrons que  
contrairement aux résultats traditionnellement obtenus, l’hypothèse de séparabilité n’est 
pas rejetée dès lors que nous contrôlons pour l’hétérogénéité inobservable.   
 
Mots clés: données de panel, effets fixes, modèles de ménage, test pour les marchés 
incomplets, micro-économie du développement. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.25 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most widely-used empirical tests for the presence of market imperfections in 
developing countries is provided by the so-called "separation" hypothesis.  Numerous papers, 
including the seminal article by Benjamin (1992), have tested the hypothesis that factor 
demands on a given plot of land will be independent of household characteristics, when 
market structure is (almost) complete (Singh, Squire and Strauss, 1986; see the summary of 
the recent literature, as well as two typical applications, in Udry, 1996).
1  Separation implies 
that the marginal productivity of inputs will be a function solely of plot characteristics and 
prices, and that households take their production decisions as if they were profit-maximizing 
firms.  In contrast, when factor demands are a function of household characteristics, marginal 
productivities are not equated across plots and a deviation with respect to the first-best 
optimum obtains.  Moreover, the production and consumption decisions of households can no 
longer be treated recursively. 
 
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that: (i) in most cases, the standard test for 
separation using panel data is biased towards rejecting the null-hypothesis of complete 
markets because of a problem of unobservable individual effects; (ii) the usual covariance 
transformations performed on panel data cannot solve this problem; but (iii) the Hausman-
Taylor (1981) estimator can.  In addition, we provide an empirical illustration in which the 
rejection of the null-hypothesis of complete markets using the standard approach is 
overturned once correlated individual effects are controlled for using the Hausman-Taylor 
estimator. 
 
In the most common version of the test for separation, the typical equation being estimated on 
plot-level agronomic data is given by : 
(1)  ihtihthtiht YXZ abe =++ , 
where  iht Y  is total labor usage (i.e., family and hired labor) on plot  i, cultivated by household 
h, at time  t,  iht X  is a matrix of plot characteristics,  ht Z  is a matrix of household 
characteristics, and  iht e  is a disturbance term that satisfies the usual Gauss-Markov 
                                                 
1 A concise primer on household models is also provided by Bardhan and Udry (1999), chapter 2.  Note that 
Benjamin (1992) used Indonesian household-level data and was therefore unable to control for individual effects 
at all. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.25 
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assumptions. Separation is then associated with a simple  F -test on the e xclusion restriction 
that  0 b = . In the prototypical expression of the test for separation (Benjamin, 1992),  ht Z  is 
household size. 
 
The main problem associated with this procedure is that the disturbance t erm  iht e  can in all 
likelihood be decomposed into : 
(2)  ihtthhtiht emllh =+++, 
where  t m  is a shock common to all plots and households at time  t,  h l  is a time-invariant 
household effect,  ht l  is a household-time effect, and  iht h  is a disturbance term that satisfies 
the usual assumptions.
2 In most plot-level datasets used in the literature, each household 
cultivates several plots.  This is a standard panel data framework, with one dimension being 
given by plots, the second by households, and the third by time. Although  h l
  can be 
accounted for by a "within" procedure which transforms variables into deviations with respect 
to their household-specific means (over  all time periods), there remains  ht l .  Since it is 
probable that  ht l  is correlated with  ht Z , the least-squares estimate of  b , even after the 
standard "within" transformation, will be biased with, in the scalar case : 
(3) 
2 ˆ ˆ plimcov[,] whtihte e bbls =+ , 
where 
2
e s  is the variance of the residual  ˆiht e  from the auxiliary "within" regression of 
household size on  iht X .
3  If  ˆ cov[,]0 htiht e l „ , as is likely in the context of what is essentially a 
labor demand equation, then all standard tests of separation are biased towards rejecting the 
null-hypothesis of complete markets. 
 
One may therefore reject the null not because market structure is necessarily incomplete, but 
simply because of a banal problem of unobservable heterogeneity.  Another way of putting 
this is that, in the standard test, the rejection of separation is conditional on the maintained 
identifying assumption that  ht l
 is the same across all households at a given time  t.  It is very 
likely that this assumption is violated. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
2 In datasets where it is possible to follow plots over time, there may also be a time-invariant plot-specific effect. 
3 Hsiao (1986), p. 64, equation (3.9.3).  The corresponding matrix expression obtains when  Zht  involves several 
household characteristics. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.25 
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The usual econometric response to a problem of unobservable individual heterogeneity in 
panel data is to apply one of the standard covariance transformations, such as the "within" 
procedure.  Here, this would involve expressing all variables as deviations with respect to 
their household-specific means,  at a given  t. While, under the assumption of exogeneity, this 
does allow one to recover unbiased estimates of  a , it has the regrettable side-effect of 
eliminating the variable(s) upon which the test for separation is based since, when one sweeps 
out  ht l , one also sweeps out  ht Z .  Since it is highly likely that  ht l  is not orthogonal to  ht Z , 
random effects are not an answer, as they too will yield biased estimates of  b .  Moreover, 
admissible exogenous instruments that would be correlated with  ht Z  but are orthogonal to  ht l  
are usually not available or, if they are, should probably already be included in  ht Z  for 
theoretical reasons.  
 
The problem, which is similar in spirit to that of consistently estimating the returns to 
education using panel data when schooling is correlated with the individual effects, can be 
solved using the Hausman-Taylor (1981, henceforth, HT) instrumental variables estimator, 
which allows o ne to control for unobservable individual effects that are correlated with  ht Z , 
while allowing one to identify  b .
4 
 
2.  AN EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE UNWARRANTED 
REJECTION OF THE NULL-HYPOTHESIS OF COMPLETE MARKETS 
 
The Hausman-Taylor instrument set 
 
Let  1iht X  be those elements of  iht X  that are uncorrelated with  ht l , while  2iht X  are those that 
are;  1ht Z  and  2ht Z  are defined in a similar manner.  The set of instruments proposed by HT 
(1981), adapted to the three-dimensional panel structure, is : 
(4)  11 [;;] HTvtihtvtihtht AQXPXZ = , 
where  vt P  and  vt Q  are the idempotent matrices that perform the "between" and "within" 
transformations at time  t, respectively.
5  Under the assumption that  iht X  is uncorrelated with 
                                                 
4 The problem here becomes identical to that considered in HT (1981) when there is no time dimension to the 
panel and one is left solely with plots and households. 
5 For simplicity of exposition, we express the instrument set as if the data were balanced.  In the empirical 
application, the unbalanced nature of the data will, of course, be taken into account. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.25 
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iht h ,  vtiht QX  is a legitimate set of instruments since  [()]0 vtihtiht EQX h ¢ = .  The basic intuition 
behind the HT estimator is that only the  ht l  component of the error term is correlated with 
22 [] ihtht XZ, which allows one to use  2 vtiht QX  as instruments for  2iht X , while  1 vtiht PX  
furnishes the instruments for  2ht Z . The HT estimator therefore allows one to control for 
unobservable correlated individual effects, while allowing one to identify the parameters of 
interest (b ) in the context of testing for separation.  A necessary condition for identification 
is that the number of elements of  1iht X  be greater than the number of elements of  2ht Z  (HT, 
1981, PROPOSITION 3.2, p. 1385).
6 
 
An empirical illustration 
 
In order to illustrate our fundamental point concerning the bias affecting conventional tests for 
separation in household models, consider the following standard procedure implemented on a 
typical plot-level dataset.  The data come from two surveys (1993, 1995) carried out in the 
village of El Oulja, Tunisia (see Matoussi and Nugent, 1989, and Laffont and Matoussi, 1996, 
for descriptions of the  village).  These data display those properties discussed in the 
introduction : a Hausman test of random household-time effects ( ht l ) versus fixed effects in 
an empirical counterpart to equations (1) and (2) strongly rejects (with a p-value below 0.001) 
the null of the absence of correlation between  ht l  and  ht Z .  The bias identified in equation (3) 
is therefore manifestly present in conventional tests o f the null-hypothesis of complete 
markets using this panel dataset. 
 
For the purpose of HT estimation, we divide the explanatory variables into two categories:  (i) 
1iht X  variables, assumed to be uncorrelated with  ht l , include four soil type dummies and a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the plot is irrigated or not, as well as a set of eight crop 
dummies;
7  (ii)  2iht X  variables, assumed to be correlated with  ht l , are given by the share of 
                                                 
6 These results have been extended by Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986) and Breusch, Mizon and Schmidt (1989) 
who suggest a broader set of instruments that should improve efficiency.  Their approach, however, is only 
possible on balanced data, which is not the case in the dataset used in this paper or, for that matter, in most plot-
level agronomic datasets. Notice that the HT instrument set is admissible only if exogeneity is satisfied.  This is 
another potential source of bias in tests for separation, but which is difficult to address because of the lack of 
admissible plot-level instruments in most datasets. 
7 The soil types are clay, red, sandy and barren, with mixed soil types being the excluded category; the crop 
dummies are other cereals, potatoes, onions, garden vegetables, tomatoes, beetroots, melon and fodder; the 
excluded category is wheat. We also include a year dummy. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.25 
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costs borne by the cultivator, divided by the share of output received, for eight different 
inputs, as well as log plot size in hectares.
8   
 
The economic rationale for allowing the variables included in  2iht X  to be correlated with  ht l  
is that they may, in the context of tenancy contracts (which account for 28 percent of the plots 
in the sample), be determined as the solution to a principal-agent relationship between a 
landlord and a tenant, and would then be functions of tenant characteristics, including those 
unobservable characteristics potentially captured by  ht l .
9  Plot size is also assumed to be 
correlated with  ht l , as it too may be chosen by landlords for plots under tenancy contracts.  
Both of these hypotheses will be subjected to a test of the corresponding overidentifying 
restrictions below.  Our single  2ht Z  variable is  given by log household size. In line with the 
usual methodology, the dependent variable is log total (hired and family) labor usage on the 
plot, in person-days per hectare.
10  Table 1 provides summary statistics on all the 
aforementioned variables.   
 
Estimation results are presented in Table 2. The standard test for separation is presented in 
column 1, and yields an unambiguous rejection of the null-hypothesis of complete markets in 
that log household size is highly significant at the usual levels of confidence (p-value below 
0.001).  In column 2, we control for time-invariant household characteristics ( h l ) using the 
"within" transformation: recall that the impact of household size can be identified here 
because we have two years of data and household size varies over the two surveys.
11  Again 
the null of complete markets is strongly rejected by the data (p-value = 0.017).
12  In column 3, 
we present results which allow for random household-time ( ht l ) effects:  this specification, 
which also rejects the null of complete markets, can however be dismissed on the basis of the 
                                                 
8 The output and cost shares both equal 1 on plots cultivated by owner-operators.  Values strictly less than or 
greater than one of the ratio obtain on plots under share tenancy contracts. 
9 An additional, empirical, motivation for using the ratios of cost-shares to the output share is that the data in 
question come from a single village and that the only source of cross-sectional variation in effective input prices 
stems from heterogeneity in contractual form on plots under tenancy contracts. 
10 Note that there are no  1 Z ht  variables in this specification. 
11 Note, despite a substantial fall in the variance of log household size, which goes from 0.328 in levels, to 0.014 
when expressed in terms of deviations with respect to household-specific means (over both periods), that the 
estimated standard error is still reasonably small, with the associated t-statistic being equal to  2.406. The time-
invariant household fixed effects ( h l ) used here correspond to the type of specification used by Udry (1996), 
Table 3, column 2, for a labor demand per hectare equation estimated on the Burkina Faso ICRISAT dataset. 
12 A household-specific random effects specification ( h l , not presented) is strongly rejected by the 
corresponding Hausman test. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.25 
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corresponding Hausman test in favor of fixed effects, as mentioned above (p-value of the 
Hausman test is below 0.001).  Of course, household-time ( ht l ) fixed effects would not allow 
one to test for separation at all in that they would also sweep out the impact of household size.   
 
In column 4, we present results corresponding to the consistent HT estimator.
13  The results 
are striking.  In contrast to what was found in columns 1 through 3, the null of complete 
markets is  not rejected at the usual levels of confidence: the point estimate of the parameter 
associated with household size is statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-value = 0.607).
14  
Moreover, the test of the overidentifying restrictions does not lead one to reject, with a p -
value equal to 0.418.  In column 5, we implement the efficient HT estimator, in which the 
variables are  q -differenced before instrumental variables are applied.  As shown by Hausman 
(1978),  q -differencing is equivalent to transforming equation  (1), by 
1/2 - W , where 
cov[|,] ihtihtht XZ e W” .  The results are very similar to those presented in column 4 though, of 
course, the standard errors are smaller.  Again, the null of complete markets is not rejected (p-
value = 0.851), and the specification is not rejected by the test of overidentifying restrictions 
(p-value = 0.524). 
 
In the context of efficient HT estimation, we also tested the hypothesis that plot size was not 
correlated with  ht l : this led to a marginal rejection of the overidentifying restrictions, with a 
p-value of 0.167.  When plot size and the contractual terms were  both assumed to be 
uncorrelated with  ht l , the overidentifying r estrictions were rejected with a p -value of 0.062. 
Clearly, the specification presented in column 5 is to be preferred, but in all cases the null-
hypothesis of complete markets could not be rejected on the basis of the parameter estimate 
associated with household size, which remained statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
 
The upshot is that, in stark contrast to the usual approach which does not control for 
unobservable individual effects, HT estimation leads to the non-rejection of the null-
hypothesis of complete markets.  Moreover the consistency of the HT-based results presented 
in columns 4 and 5 is ensured, in that they are not rejected by the tests of the corresponding  
                                                 
13 By "consistent", we mean that the variables are not  q -differenced before instrumental variables are applied.  
See HT, section 2.3. 
14 Note that all other point estimates presented in column 4 are fairly close to those obtained using household-
specific fixed effects in column 2, except for that associated with the irrigated plot dummy and the seeds cost 
share. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.25 
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overidentifying restrictions.  As noted by HT, these tests have considerable power, in that the 
maintained assumptions on which they are based are those needed to ensure consistency of 
the "within" estimator, which are weak.  
 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper has shown that the rejection of the null-hypothesis of complete markets i n 
household models, based on the widely-used test of the exclusion restrictions implied by 
separation, can be entirely due to the bias stemming from uncontrolled-for unobservable 
individual heterogeneity.   Our results are particularly important for plot-level panel datasets 
where no time dimension is present, since there is  no means at all, apart from the HT 
estimator, of testing for separation while controlling for unobservable individual effects (i) if 
the latter are correlated with the household-level v ariable that is the focus of the test, and (ii) 
if no exogenous instruments are available. As was the case with the dataset considered in our 
empirical illustration, both of these conditions are likely to hold in practice.   
 
The implications of our results are, moreover, suggestive, in that there may be other received 
results in applied microeconomics, based on panel data, to which the HT estimator could be 
fruitfully applied.  An obvious example is constituted by tests of the precautionary savings 
motive, in which empirical measures of the risks faced by households are usually time 
invariant, and in which no attempt is made to correct for unobservable individual effects. 
 
Our results bring the methodology of testing for separation using panel data into sharper 
focus.  This is because we do not reject the null hypothesis of complete markets, conditional 
on  ht l .  If one estimates a labor demand function on US individual  firm data, as in Griliches 
and Hausman (1986), one finds correlated individual firms effects, as we have found here for 
households.  Thus, by analogy, profit-maximizing behavior by firms is not incompatible with 
correlated individual effects.  However, in our dataset, since labor demand is a function  ht l , it 
is not independent of household characteristics  per se, although they are  unobservable 
characteristics.  Another way of putting this is that, in most panel datasets, testing for 
separation will undoubtedly uncover correlated individual effects.  If separation is taken in its 
strictest sense to mean that factor demands should be independent of household 
characteristics, unconditional on  ht l , then we do in fact reject the null-hypothesis of complete CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.25 
  10
markets.   Any structural interpretation, in terms of which market failures are binding, of the 
pattern of violations of separation based on observable household characteristics (and thus on 
those elements of  b  which are statistically  different from zero) will probably, however, be 
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Table 1.  Summary statistics, El Oulja, Tunisia CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.25 
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447 plots () i , 150 households () h ,  196 household-years () ht  
  Mean  Median  Std. dev. 
Person-days labor input per hectare () iht Y   190.860  119.0  253.271 
Plot characteristics  1 () iht X :       
Soil type 1 (clay)  0.190  0.0  0.393 
Soil type 2 (red)  0.201  0.0  0.401 
Soil type 3 (sandy)  0.446  0.0  0.497 
Soil type 4 (barren)  0.058  0.0  0.235 
Irrigated plot  0.882  1.0  0.322 
Contractual terms  2 () iht X :       
% of costs paid by the cultivator / % of 
output to the cultivator for : 
     
Manure  1.008  1.0  0.121 
Chemical fertilizer  1.016  1.0  0.145 
Irrigation  0.999  1.0  0.150 
Plowing  0.984  1.0  0.250 
Family labor  1.063  1.0  0.243 
Hired labor  1.041  1.0  0.230 
Seeds  1.008  1.0  0.094 
Transportation  1.006  1.0  0.171 
Surface of plot (hectares)  5.615  1.5  13.535 
Household size  2 () ht Z   8.257  7.0  5.117 
Note: many households did not engage in crop production in the second survey (1995) because of adverse 
climatic shocks; this explains why the number of household-years ( ht ) is much smaller than twice the number of 
households ( h ). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2002.25 
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Table 2.  Labor demand equations: Pooling, fixed effects, random effects,  
and Hausman-Taylor estimators 
Dependent variable: log person-days per hectare used on plot 
447 plots () i , 150 households () h ,  196 household-years () ht   
(t-statistics in parentheses below coefficients, unless otherwise noted) 
 
 
Mean of dependent variable = 3.825 
Pooling  Fixed  
effects 
h l  
Random 
effects 
ht l  
HT 
(consistent) 
ht l  
HT 
(efficient) 
ht l  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Plot characteristics  1 () iht X            
Soil type 1 (clay)  -0.012  0.189  0.045  0.164  0.091 
  (-0.046)  (0.512)  (0.153)  (0.506)  (0.306) 
Soil type 2 (red)  -0.467  -0.310  -0.456  -0.425  -0.404 
  (-1.708)  (-0.920)  (-1.618)  (-1.001)  (-1.237) 
Soil type 3 (sandy)  -0.170  -0.031  -0.149  0.120  0.015 
  (-0.674)  (-0.096)  (-0.557)  (0.370)  (0.059) 
Soil type 4 (barren)  0.305  0.377  0.130  0.387  0.176 
  (0.819)  (0.886)  (0.344)  (0.998)  (0.476) 
Irrigated plot  0.576  0.371  0.563  1.209  0.893 
  (2.322)  (1.461)  (2.669)  (3.845)  (3.829) 
Joint significance of plot characteristics: 
2












Contractual terms  2 () iht X            
% of costs paid by the cultivator / % of 
output to the cultivator for : 
         
Manure  0.974  4.175  1.496  2.622  3.089 
  (0.998)  (4.217)  (1.657)  (1.303)  (2.966) 
Chemical fertilizer  1.069  -0.429  0.973  -0.391  -0.214 
  (1.239)  (-0.472)  (1.168)  (-0.242)  (-0.244) 
Irrigation  -0.128  1.891  0.333  1.443  1.443 
  (-0.191)  (2.658)  (0.525)  (1.472)  (2.227) 
Plowing  -0.080  -1.415  -0.428  -0.914  -0.956 
  (-0.212)  (-2.931)  (-1.146)  (-1.413)  (-2.753) 
Family labor  0.775  -0.230  0.544  0.056  -0.158 
  (1.703)  (-0.378)  (1.219)  (0.108)  (-0.369) 
Hired labor  -0.619  -0.407  -0.673  -0.612  -0.674 
  (-1.246)  (-0.718)  (-1.442)  (-1.252)  (-1.889) 
Seeds  -0.674  -2.750  -0.815  0.900  0.399 
  (-0.705)  (-2.465)  (-0.891)  (0.496)  (0.441) 
Transportation  -1.073  -1.037  -1.304  -1.006  -1.251 
  (-1.837)  (-1.732)  (-2.475)  (-1.508)  (-2.427) 
Log surface of plot (ha)  -1.008  -0.4561  -0.7416  -0.4789  -0.4542 
  (-15.275)  (-4.945)  (-11.024)  (-3.689)  (-5.609) 
Joint significance of cost shares : 
2












Log household size  2 () ht Z   0.571  1.055  0.408  0.309  0.124 
  (4.741)  (2.406)  (2.554)  (0.513)  (0.188) 
2 R   0.6934  0.8816  0.6805  0.6334  0.6583 
s   1.4263  1.0824  1.4680  1.5657  0.8721 
Test of overidifying restrictions 
 [d.f., p-value] 




Note: intercept, year dummy, and eight crop dummies included in all specifications (no constant in col. (2)); 
random effects rejected in favor of fixed effects in columns (2) and (3) by Hausman test with an associated p-
values of  less than 0.0001.  HT estimation carried out by interpreting the HT instrument set (eq. (4)) as a set of 
orthogonality conditions and applying GMM. 